利用Windbg分析Magicodes.IE一次错误编写导致内存剧增
2024-09-05 07:17:36
由于这近一年时间一直忙于写书和工作，一直没有水文，但是近期有几位朋友使用我们的Magicodes.IE反馈在导出过程中内存暴涨...好吧，不管怎样，不能苦了我们朋友，接下来我们通过windbg来看一下什么原因导致的。
接下来我们先通过address -summary来看一下当前应用内存占用量。
0:000> !address -summary
--- Usage Summary ---------------- RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal
Free 581 7df8`ef0c9000 ( 125.972 TB) 98.42%
<unknown> 1678 206`ffb9e000 ( 2.027 TB) 99.99% 1.58%
Image 950 0`064fd000 ( 100.988 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
Heap 58 0`050f6000 ( 80.961 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
Stack 156 0`04380000 ( 67.500 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
Other 11 0`019ad000 ( 25.676 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
TEB 52 0`00068000 ( 416.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00%
PEB 1 0`00001000 ( 4.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00%
--- Type Summary (for busy) ------ RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal
MEM_MAPPED 282 200`038a6000 ( 2.000 TB) 98.64% 1.56%
MEM_PRIVATE 1674 7`07184000 ( 28.111 GB) 1.35% 0.02%
MEM_IMAGE 950 0`064fd000 ( 100.988 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
--- State Summary ---------------- RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal
MEM_FREE 581 7df8`ef0c9000 ( 125.972 TB) 98.42%
MEM_RESERVE 295 205`f8659000 ( 2.023 TB) 99.79% 1.58%
MEM_COMMIT 2611 1`188ce000 ( 4.384 GB) 0.21% 0.00%
--- Protect Summary (for commit) - RgnCount ----------- Total Size -------- %ofBusy %ofTotal
PAGE_READWRITE 1595 1`0dc6c000 ( 4.215 GB) 0.20% 0.00%
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ 156 0`04d66000 ( 77.398 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
PAGE_READONLY 600 0`03851000 ( 56.316 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
PAGE_NOACCESS 99 0`021f2000 ( 33.945 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE 19 0`0027b000 ( 2.480 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
PAGE_WRITECOPY 90 0`001a0000 ( 1.625 MB) 0.00% 0.00%
PAGE_READWRITE | PAGE_GUARD 52 0`0009e000 ( 632.000 kB) 0.00% 0.00%
--- Largest Region by Usage ----------- Base Address -------- Region Size ----------
Free 189`0413c000 7c6b`01ed4000 ( 124.418 TB)
<unknown> 7dfb`2a153000 1f9`bd2ef000 ( 1.976 TB)
Image 7ffc`883c1000 0`009ba000 ( 9.727 MB)
Heap 183`0e9a1000 0`00f01000 ( 15.004 MB)
Stack 37`62980000 0`0017b000 ( 1.480 MB)
Other 183`77707000 0`01775000 ( 23.457 MB)
TEB 37`62600000 0`00002000 ( 8.000 kB)
PEB 37`627dd000 0`00001000 ( 4.000 kB)
MEM_COMMIT占用了4.384G，接下来我们利用eeheap -gc来检查托管堆。
0:000> !eeheap -gc
GC Allocated Heap Size: Size: 0x11ac2568 (296494440) bytes.
GC Committed Heap Size: Size: 0x120e7000 (302936064) bytes.
根据这些内存来看，似乎问题不是这里，大量的内存还是出现在非托管。我们利用Windows NT堆来看一下，其实在Windows中大多数的用户堆分配器都在ntdll.dll中的NT堆管理器API（RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap）上建立，比如说C中的malloc/free和new/delete，另外还有COM框架中的SysAllocString以及在Win32中的LocalAlloc、GlobalAlloc和HeapAlloc，虽然说这些分配器都会创建不同的堆来存储它们的内存，但是他们最终都要调用ntdll.dll中的NT堆来实现。
0:000> !heap -s
************************************************************************************************************************
NT HEAP STATS BELOW
************************************************************************************************************************
NtGlobalFlag enables following debugging aids for new heaps:
stack back traces
LFH Key : 0x7cfd4cc2db4ddb4d
Termination on corruption : ENABLED
Heap Flags Reserv Commit Virt Free List UCR Virt Lock Fast
(k) (k) (k) (k) length blocks cont. heap
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0000018378fd0000 08000002 65128 15296 64928 1720 177 17 2 c LFH
External fragmentation 11 % (177 free blocks)
00000183775c0000 08008000 64 4 64 2 1 1 0 0
000001837aa90000 08001002 1280 108 1080 26 3 2 0 0 LFH
000001837ad20000 08001002 60 8 60 2 1 1 0 0
000001837aca0000 08041002 60 8 60 5 1 1 0 0
000001887bfd0000 08001002 60 20 60 1 2 1 0 0
000001830cf30000 08001002 3324 1364 3124 19 10 3 0 0 LFH
000001830ce30000 08001002 60 8 60 5 1 1 0 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
输出结果如上所示，NT堆内容好少....什么原因....好吧根据 maoni所说，似乎是验证出了问题。
GC没有管辖这些内存，所以说还是我们编写的代码有问题，我们返过来再考虑一个事情，“导出进行时，内存会大量增加，导出完成后内存会降低下去”。我们来看一下代码，如下所示，其实我们现在明白的是，在我们执行期间肯定是这些内存一直“持有”，并没有被释放掉。
app.MapGet("/excel", async content =>
{
string path = Path.Combine(Directory.GetCurrentDirectory(), "test.xlsx");
List<TestDto> list = new();
for (int i = 0; i < 400; i++)
{
list.Add(new TestDto
{
ImageUrl = "https://gimg2.baidu.com/image_search/src=http%3A%2F%2Fup.enterdesk.com%2Fedpic_source%2F53%2F0a%2Fda%2F530adad966630fce548cd408237ff200.jpg&refer=http%3A%2F%2Fup.enterdesk.com&app=2002&size=f9999,10000&q=a80&n=0&g=0n&fmt=jpeg?sec=1641193100&t=417a589da8c9ba3103ed74c33fbd6c70"
});
}
Stopwatch stopwatch = Stopwatch.StartNew();
ExcelExporter exporter = new ExcelExporter();
await exporter.Export(path, list);
stopwatch.Stop();
await content.Response.WriteAsync(stopwatch.Elapsed.TotalSeconds.ToString());
});
根据内存的表现和我们的理论，我们继续利用windbg来排查一下，现在其实我们可以发现，这些对象最终还是被GC收回了，带着理论我们继续构思，GC是知道哪些对象可以终结的对吧？并且它们在变成不可到达时调用它们的终结器，在GC中会利用finalization queue来记录这些终结对象。所以说我们是不是可以查一下？如下所示，我们来看一下。
0:000> !finalizequeue
----------------------------------
Statistics for all finalizable objects (including all objects ready for finalization):
MT Count TotalSize Class Name
00007ffc2dc23818 1 24 System.Net.Security.SafeCredentialReference
00007ffc2dac4238 1 24 System.WeakReference
00007ffc2d6eb908 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.KestrelServerOptions, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
00007ffc2d6e4120 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Runtime.Loader.AssemblyLoadContext, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d572b68 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.ServiceProvider, Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection]]
00007ffc2d429258 1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.IO.FileSystemWatcher, System.IO.FileSystem.Watcher]]
00007ffc2dd15c20 1 32 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeBCryptAlgorithmHandle
00007ffc2d6de4d8 1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeLocalAllocHandle
00007ffc2d68fa00 1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertStoreHandle
00007ffc2d3a5cc0 1 32 System.Net.Quic.Implementations.MsQuic.Internal.SafeMsQuicRegistrationHandle
00007ffc2db390c8 1 40 Interop+WinHttp+SafeWinHttpHandle
00007ffc2d69a420 1 40 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertContextHandle
00007ffc2d5bea18 1 40 System.Diagnostics.EventLog
00007ffc2dc29a38 1 48 System.Net.Security.SafeFreeCredential_SECURITY
00007ffc2d963f80 2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexReplacement, System.Text.RegularExpressions]]
00007ffc2d7a3750 2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelConnection, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
00007ffc2d685e10 1 56 System.Runtime.CompilerServices.ConditionalWeakTable`2+Container[[System.Buffers.TlsOverPerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool`1+ThreadLocalArray[[System.Char, System.Private.CoreLib]][], System.Private.CoreLib],[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d44c4d0 1 56 System.Runtime.CompilerServices.ConditionalWeakTable`2+Container[[System.Buffers.TlsOverPerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool`1+ThreadLocalArray[[System.Byte, System.Private.CoreLib]][], System.Private.CoreLib],[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d96be68 1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Uri, System.Private.Uri]]
00007ffc2d96b780 1 64 FlagCellStore
00007ffc2d96af48 1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d96a5b8 1 64 CellStore`1[[OfficeOpenXml.ExcelCoreValue, Magicodes.IE.EPPlus]]
00007ffc2d6ddab8 2 64 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeChainEngineHandle
00007ffc2d69d528 2 64 Internal.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
00007ffc2d685bc8 2 64 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeWaitHandle
00007ffc2d685280 3 72 System.Threading.ThreadInt64PersistentCounter+ThreadLocalNodeFinalizationHelper
00007ffc2d5f5f50 3 72 System.Runtime.InteropServices.PosixSignalRegistration
00007ffc2d4299d0 1 72 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeFileHandle
00007ffc2d6e40b8 1 80 System.Runtime.Loader.DefaultAssemblyLoadContext
00007ffc2dac9ed0 2 96 PageIndex
00007ffc2d96d0c8 2 96 ColumnIndex
00007ffc2d464470 3 120 System.Gen2GcCallback
00007ffc2d40a620 1 120 System.IO.FileSystemWatcher
00007ffc2d96bc18 2 128 CellStore`1[[System.Int32, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2dac20c8 2 144 System.Reflection.Emit.DynamicResolver
00007ffc2d680f10 3 144 System.Threading.LowLevelLock
00007ffc2d683c48 3 168 System.Threading.ThreadPoolWorkQueueThreadLocals
00007ffc2d681e80 1 176 System.Threading.LowLevelLifoSemaphore
00007ffc2dc25ef0 1 184 System.Collections.Concurrent.CDSCollectionETWBCLProvider
00007ffc2db8e658 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2db8c378 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2db38f90 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2d90c658 1 184 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStreamManager+Events
00007ffc2d689b48 1 184 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Certificates.Generation.CertificateManager+CertificateManagerEventSource
00007ffc2d66f9f8 1 184 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.FrameworkEventSource
00007ffc2d66b720 1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
00007ffc2d44d128 1 184 System.Buffers.ArrayPoolEventSource
00007ffc2d2e2ec8 1 184 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.NativeRuntimeEventSource
00007ffc2d694e10 1 192 System.Threading.Tasks.TplEventSource
00007ffc2d572ab0 1 192 Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.DependencyInjectionEventSource
00007ffc2d505f00 1 200 Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.EventSource.LoggingEventSource
00007ffc2db8ade8 1 224 System.Net.NameResolutionTelemetry
00007ffc2d428b08 7 224 System.Threading.PreAllocatedOverlapped
00007ffc2d563c78 1 232 System.Diagnostics.DiagnosticSourceEventSource
00007ffc2d61fe88 1 240 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting.HostingEventSource
00007ffc2db6b788 8 256 System.Threading.TimerQueue+AppDomainTimerSafeHandle
00007ffc2d690270 1 280 System.Net.Sockets.SocketsTelemetry
00007ffc2db6bc80 1 296 System.Net.Http.HttpTelemetry
00007ffc2d68b998 1 336 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelEventSource
00007ffc2dc21998 1 360 System.Net.Security.NetSecurityTelemetry
00007ffc2d2dae28 1 384 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.RuntimeEventSource
00007ffc2d66ad60 10 480 System.Net.Sockets.SafeSocketHandle
00007ffc2d2e0240 21 504 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource, System.Private.CoreLib]]
00007ffc2d2b0538 9 648 System.Threading.Thread
00007ffc2d77a188 2 704 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Sockets.Internal.SocketReceiver
00007ffc2d90cec0 6 960 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStream
00007ffc2d5fc658 10 1280 System.Net.Sockets.Socket
00007ffc2d68d898 4 1536 System.Net.Sockets.Socket+AwaitableSocketAsyncEventArgs
00007ffc2d2dc778 42 4704 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource+OverrideEventProvider
00007ffc2daec058 356 14240 System.Drawing.Bitmap
Total 553 objects
WOW！！！，看上面356个System.Drawing.Bitmap在等待回收，看起来这是我们的影响因素，我们来查一下代码。
try
{
cell.Value = string.Empty;
Bitmap bitmap;
if (url.IsBase64StringValid())
{
bitmap = url.Base64StringToBitmap();
}
else
{
bitmap = Extension.GetBitmapByUrl(url);
}
if (bitmap == null)
{
cell.Value = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Alt;
}
else
{
ExcelPicture pic = CurrentExcelWorksheet.Drawings.AddPicture(Guid.NewGuid().ToString(), bitmap);
AddImage((rowIndex + (ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex > 1 ? ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex : 0)),
colIndex - ignoreCount, pic, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.YOffset, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.XOffset);
CurrentExcelWorksheet.Row(rowIndex + 1).Height = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height;
pic.SetSize(ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Width * 7, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height);
}
}
catch (Exception)
{
cell.Value = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Alt;
}
在ExcelPicture对象中去使用Bitmap对象，对于在线图片源来说，我们会读取并存储到Bitmap中，但是我们发现并没有对该对象进行释放操作，所以导致大量的Bitmap一直没有释放，我们通过using来处理一下。
using (ExcelPicture pic = CurrentExcelWorksheet.Drawings.AddPicture(Guid.NewGuid().ToString(), bitmap))
{
AddImage((rowIndex + (ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex > 1 ? ExcelExporterSettings.HeaderRowIndex : 0)),
colIndex - ignoreCount, pic, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.YOffset, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.XOffset);
CurrentExcelWorksheet.Row(rowIndex + 1).Height = ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height;
pic.SetSize(ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Width * 7, ExporterHeaderList[colIndex].ExportImageFieldAttribute.Height);
}
一个带有终结器的新对象是必须要被添加进finalization queue中的，这个行为也被称为“终结注册（registering for finalization）”。
当然我也建议你选择使用SOSEX扩展插件，它提供了finalization类似的内容，似乎看起来更直观一些，如下所示。
下载地址：http://www.stevestechspot.com/default.aspx
:000> .load D:\sosex_64\sosex.dll
This dump has no SOSEX heap index.
The heap index makes searching for references and roots much faster.
To create a heap index, run !bhi
0:000> !finq -stat
Generation 0:
Count Total Size Type
---------------------------------------------------------
54 2160 System.Drawing.Bitmap
54 objects, 2,160 bytes
Generation 1:
Count Total Size Type
---------------------------------------------------------
1 184 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Certificates.Generation.CertificateManager+CertificateManagerEventSource
1 336 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelEventSource
4 1536 System.Net.Sockets.Socket+AwaitableSocketAsyncEventArgs
1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertStoreHandle
1 280 System.Net.Sockets.SocketsTelemetry
1 192 System.Threading.Tasks.TplEventSource
1 40 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeCertContextHandle
2 64 Internal.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeRegistryHandle
2 64 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeChainEngineHandle
1 32 Internal.Cryptography.Pal.Native.SafeLocalAllocHandle
1 80 System.Runtime.Loader.DefaultAssemblyLoadContext
1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Runtime.Loader.AssemblyLoadContext, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 24 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.KestrelServerOptions, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
2 704 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Transport.Sockets.Internal.SocketReceiver
2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core.Internal.Infrastructure.KestrelConnection, Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.Kestrel.Core]]
1 184 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStreamManager+Events
6 960 Microsoft.IO.RecyclableMemoryStream
2 48 System.WeakReference`1[[System.Text.RegularExpressions.RegexReplacement, System.Text.RegularExpressions]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[OfficeOpenXml.ExcelCoreValue, Magicodes.IE.EPPlus]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Object, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 64 FlagCellStore
2 128 CellStore`1[[System.Int32, System.Private.CoreLib]]
1 64 CellStore`1[[System.Uri, System.Private.Uri]]
2 96 ColumnIndex
2 144 System.Reflection.Emit.DynamicResolver
1 24 System.WeakReference
2 96 PageIndex
302 12080 System.Drawing.Bitmap
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 40 Interop+WinHttp+SafeWinHttpHandle
8 256 System.Threading.TimerQueue+AppDomainTimerSafeHandle
1 296 System.Net.Http.HttpTelemetry
1 224 System.Net.NameResolutionTelemetry
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 184 System.Net.NetEventSource
1 360 System.Net.Security.NetSecurityTelemetry
1 24 System.Net.Security.SafeCredentialReference
1 184 System.Collections.Concurrent.CDSCollectionETWBCLProvider
1 48 System.Net.Security.SafeFreeCredential_SECURITY
1 32 Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeBCryptAlgorithmHandle
499 objects, 30,736 bytes
Generation 2:
0 objects, 0 bytes
TOTAL: 553 objects, 32,896 bytes
可能大家都会像我一开始有个疑问，你这个图片我看了...没有那么大，并且在windbg中也没有表现大小呀。首先我们先来看一下这个图片的质量。
图片的像素为2560x1440，位深为24目前已知这些信息，我们计算一下未压缩的图片大小。
2560x1440x24/8
10M左右一张图，已知图片数x10M=3G，其实对于这个问题来说，这并不属于内存泄漏。
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